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Abstract—Ethereum is an open-source, public,
blockchain-based distributed computing platform and
operating system featuring smart contract functional-
ity. In this paper, we proposed an Ethereum based
eletronic voting (e-voting) protocol, Ques-Chain, which
can ensure the authentication can be done without
hurting confidentiality and the anonymity can be pro-
tected without problems of scams at the same time.
Furthermore, the authors considered the wider usages
Ques-Chain can be applied on, pointing out that it is
able to process all kinds of messages and can be used
in all fields with similar needs.
Index Terms—Electronic voting, Ethereum, Smart
contracts, Blind signature
I. Introduction
E-voting and web-based survey are popular ways to
collect opinions from citizens, clients, employees and some-
times organizations or companies. The conductors of elec-
tions, evaluations or questionnaires expect voters to give
real and practical comments on their particular topics.
However, e-voting systems face the threat of malicious
manipulation by hackers. Questionnaire and poll service
providers also struggle to prevent and eliminate scams,
given the high costs to perform data cleaning. On the
other hand, voters may doubt the integrity of the voting
procedure and worry about anonymity failure. Thus, an e-
voting system ought to be capable of conducting authenti-
cation, providing transparency, protecting anonymity, se-
curing ballots, and yielding accurate statistics. Blockchain,
initially introduced as a distributed ledger and nowa-
days a computation vender, has proved its inherence
in providing immutability, verifiability and decentralized
consensus throughout its very first application, bitcoin
the cryptocurrency. Ethereum (ETH), a blockchain, and
Smart Contract, a way to assign computing missions to
the Ethereum network, have become the de facto standard
of blockchain-based trusted computing. Provided the out-
standing features, it is promising to base future e-voting
systems on blockchain technology.
The paper is structured as follows: section II introduces
existing works on e-voting and blockchain, section III sums
up our main contributions, section IV presents two tech-
niques which our work based on. Ques-Chain’s mathemat-
ical model and scheme detail are provided respectively in
section V and section VI. Ques-Chain’s security properties
are analyzed in section VII. Section VIII introduces some
application scenarios of Ques-Chain.
II. Related Work
There has been extensive research on adopting
blockchain into e-voting and surveys. Reference [1] in-
troduced a multi-agent system, in which several kinds of
intelligent agents act as blockchain computing nodes, to
ensure voters’ right to audit and verify the voting process.
Liu and Wang designed a feasible and flexible e-voting
scheme with no dependency on time-triggered protocol
(TTP), trusted third party, on the blockchain and fulfilled
criteria on general voting systems [2]. Liu and Wang also
provided certain remedies for data neutrality deficiency
and privacy risk in data transmission. Panja and Roy
applied blockchain technology to the existing DRE-ip e-
voting system, which protects verified ballots from being
modified before the tallying phase and provide a substitute
to secure bulletin board [3]. Permissioned sidechains [4]
can be adopted in e-voting systems for voter verification
and voting operation recording, each computed and stored
on its respective one-way pegged sidechain but linked by
the upper layer network. Hjalmarsson et al. conducted
votes on private chains with the utilized smart contract
to improve the processing speed and throughput, as well
as to ease the load and save computational spends [5].
Blockchain-based computing networks, by exploiting the
consensus of nodes, are able to reject fraudulent ballots
and guarantee the voting result unforgeable and transpar-
ent [6].
III. Main Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are summed up as
follows:
1) We have proposed a message authentication and
transmission mechanism that allows permission
checking while preserving anonymity. The mecha-
nism can be utilized in various scenarios includ-
ing vote, questionnaire, outcome assessment, opinion
collection, complaint reporting and so on.
2) We have decoupled the blind signing and checking
procedure into three steps, respectively processed by
the organizer, the voters, and the Ques-Chain smart
contract. With such a design, authentications can be
carried out without sacrificing voters’ anonymity and
messages’ confidentiality. In applications like opinion
collection, it can also prevent spamming.
3) We have implemented the complete mechanism,
featuring trusted computing technology based on
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2Ethereum. Our well-designed architecture guaran-
tees the integrity of all parties.
IV. Main Techniques
In this session, we will introduce main techniques we
used in our protocol.
A. Blind Signature
Blind signature was firstly introduced by Chaum [7].
Same as digital signature, blind signature is used for
validating the authenticity of a message. The difference
between both methods of signature is that the messages
are blinded and encrypted, which means that the data
being signed varies from the original message. And the
method assure that the one who receive the message can
get the original message by unblinding and decrypting it.
The process is same as applying a legacy digital signature
to the original message. Therefore, the authenticity of the
message can be verified by validating it with the public key
of the signature. Blind signature can be used in e-voting
system to perform better privacy protection for voters [8].
B. Ethereum
Ethereum acts as a general decentralized computing
platform based on blockchain for economic benefit and new
kinds of calculating applications. It offers a decentralized
Turing complete virtual machine called Ethereum virtual
machine (EVM), where scripts for the platform can be run.
The scripts are called smart contracts, which is mostly
written in Solidity, a script language designed for EVM.
After deployment, the scripts will automatically execute
in decentralized network transparently. Transaction and
deployment in Ethereum network require gas, a fraction
of Ethereum token, which forms the justice and fairness
of the blockchain [9].
V. Notations
In this session, we will introduce notations which were
used in our paper. All participants involved in the vote can
be divided into three types - voter, organizer and Ques-
Chain Contract.
• Voter, one who has the permission to vote.
• Organizer, one who initiated the vote, each e-voting
only has one organizer.
• Ques-Chain Contract, a Smart Contract on EVM,
which act as an inspector, contains
– Public key, unchangeable key provided by the
organizer to check the signature.
– Judge function, a function to judge if the ballot
is valid or not.
– Ballot box a decentralized database to store valid
ballots.
Let Voters be the set of all the voter,
∀voter ∈ Voters, |Voters| ≥ 1.
TABLE I
Data Owned by Different Types of Participants
organizer voter
−sk −r
+pk +address/−accounts
+address/−accounts −address/−accounts
−uuid
Let Users be the set of organizer, Ques-Chain Contract,
and all voter,
Users = Voters ∪ {organizer} ∪ {Ques-Chain}.
All the elements in Users has its accounts in ETH.
Communications through ETH account during the e-
voting, which will be recorded by ETH, can be represented
like,
a
c−−−−→
memo
b where a, b ∈ Users
and c is the objects they what to send; memo is the
explanation authors want to add.
Applying function f to object x can be represent like
f(x),
e.g.
m′ = Hash(m).
Encrypt or decrypt message by function
Enc(key,message) and Dec(key,message).
e.g.
m′ = Enc(pk,m)
where m′ is the encrypted message of m under key pk.
Data (i.e. Public key) owned by different types of par-
ticipants by Unified Modeling Language (UML) in Table
I.
1) sk/pk: to sign/check the signature.
2) address/accounts: an ETH account, to prove who
you are during communications.
3) address/accounts‘: an anonymous ETH account,
which was randomly generated, destroyed immedi-
ately.
4) r: a key to blind the message, which was randomly
generated, stored only in local.
5) uuid: to identify different ballots, which was ran-
domly generated, stored only in local.
VI. Details of Protocol
In this session, we will introduce each stage of our
protocol during the e-voting, which can be roughly divided
into setup stage, sign stage, vote stage and count stage.
A. Setup Stage
The organizer should initialize the e-voting by following
steps,
1) construct a Ques-Chain like Smart Contract with its
pk, vote-start time st, vote-check time ct and vote-
end time et.
organizer pk,st,ct,et−−−−−−−−→
unchangable
Ques-Chain
3Fig. 1. Setup stage in Ques-Chain protocol.
2) construct and publish the voting page.
3) make a permission list of all voters’ address like,
Voters = {voterA, voterB, voterC, . . .}
Applying function Chance() on voter to find out
number of submissions the voter allowed.
Then the voters can construct their ballots, represented
by ballot.
B. Sign Stage
In this stage, the voter will get a signed-blinded-ballot
from the organizer. Before ct and after st, the voter should
do the following steps.
Firstly, the voter need to get the hash of ballot.
Then, the voter randomly generated a key r and an uuid,
stored only locally. Append the uuid into the end of m and
encrypt them by r, get the BlindedBallot.
BlindedBallot = Enc(r,Hash(ballot) + uuid)
where the operator + means append into the end.
After that, the voter send BlindedBallot to the organizer
through its ETH accounts which had the permission to
vote.
voter BlindedBallot−−−−−−−−−→ organizer
The organizer could decide whether to sign or not by
Algorithm 1 and then send the SignedBlindedBallot to the
voter.
organizer SignedBlindedBallot−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ voter
It should be noted that the organizer can’t get any infor-
mation of r and uuid for them only being stored locally.
And for the voter, to ensure the organizer give
all the voters the same signature, he should send
SignedBlindedBallot and BlindedBallot to Ques-Chain
Contract to check the signature.
In the end, the voter send SignedBlindedBallot and
BlindedBallot to Ques-Chain Contract for checking.
voter BlindedBallot−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
SignedBlindedBallot
Ques-Chain
Ques-Chain Contract will check the signature and re-
turn result by Algorithm 2.
If result is True, the voter can step into next stage,
else he should communicate with the organizer to
find out what’s wrong with the SignedBlindedBallot or
BlindedBallot.
Algorithm 1 Decide whether to sign or not.
Require: address, BlindedBallot
1: if address in Voters and Chance(address)>0 then
2: SignedBlindedBallot = Enc(sk, BlindedBallot)
3: Chance(address) = Chance(address) - 1
4: else
5: SignedBlindedBallot = 0
6: end if
7: return SignedBlindedBallot
Algorithm 2 Signature check in Ques-Chain contract.
Require: SignedBlindedBallot, BlindedBallot
1: if Dec(pk, SignedBlindedBallot) = BlindedBallot
then
2: result = True
3: else
4: result = False
5: end if
6: return result
C. Vote Stage
In this stage, the voter will vote. Before et and after ct,
the voter should do the following steps.
1) decrypt the SignedBlindedBallot to SignedBallot.
SignedBallot = Dec(r, SignedBlindedBallot)
2) randomly generated a new ETH account account′
with address′, stored only locally.
3) anonymously send the SignedBallot, Ballot, uuid to
Ques-Chain Contract through account′.
voter SignedBallot,Ballot,uuid−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
through account′
Ques-Chain
It should be noted that account′ is generated randomly
and only stored locally, so no one (except the voter) will
know whom account′ belongs to, which made it untrace-
able.
Fig. 2. Sign stage in Ques-Chain protocol
4Algorithm 3 Judge function.
Require: SignedBallot,Ballot,uuid
1: if Dec(pk,SignedBallot) = Hash(Ballot) + uuid
and not (uuid in BallotBox.values()) then
2: Add map (Ballot, uuid) into BallotBox
3: result = True
4: else
5: result = False
6: end if
7: return result
D. Count Stage
In this stage, the voter will count legal ballots and
publish the result.
Here we use a map BallotBox to store legal ballots and
its uuid. Each time Ques-Chain Contract receive a ballot,
Ques-Chain Contract will check the ballot by Algorithm
3.
Every legal ballot will be stored in BallotBox while
illegal ballots will be ignored.
After et, all users of the ETH can get the result of the
vote by counting all ballots in BallotBox.
E. Publish Option
Due to the feature of ETH, the result of the vote will
be published on ETH and everyone which everyone is
accessible. However, in some scenery, the organizer may
want to keep secret of the result or want to control whether
push it. Here we give an option for the organizer to set
whether publish or not by generating an extra pk′′ − sk′′
and use the Enc(pk,Ballot) replaces the Ballot on sign
stage and vote stage. The organizer can publish the result
by publishing sk′′.
VII. Security Analysis
According to the standard mentioned on the reference,
our protocol equipped following security properties:
Correctness If all the election’s participants, such as
voters, authorities and so on are honest and behave as it
is scheduled, then the final results are effectively the tally
of casted votes.
Privacy No participant other than a voter should be
able to determine the value of the vote cast by that voter.
Robustness Faulty behavior of any coalition of author-
ities can be tolerated. No coalition of voters can disrupt
the election, and any cheating voter will be detected.
Verifiability Correct voting processes must be verifiable
to prevent incorrect voting results.
Democracy There are two requirements to satisfy in
democracy,
• Eligibility : only authorized voters are allowed to vote.
• Prevention of multiple voting : all eligible voters are
allowed to cast the scheduled vote’s number (function
of the election system and his part in it) and not
TABLE II
Security Properties of the Protocol
Requirement Property
Privacy Correct
Receipt-Freeness Attacks Found
Robustness Correct
Verifiability UI Correct
Democracy EPMV Correct
Fairness Correct
Correctness Correct
more, such that each voter has his intended power
in deciding the outcome of the voting.
Fairness No participant can gain any knowledge, except
his vote, about the (partial) tally before the counting
stage (The knowledge of the partial tally could affect the
intentions of the voters who has not yet voted.)
However, some attacks remain as follow.
Receipt-Freeness Voters must neither be able to obtain
nor construct a receipt which can prove the content of their
vote.
For the voters have key r, which was used to blind the
ballots, to prove the content of their vote, our protocol
doesn’t equip Receipt-Freeness.
In general, the security properties of the protocol as
shown in Table II.
VIII. Usages
Ques-Chain can be applied to applications varying from
the national referendum to internal evaluations conducted
by companies.
In the case of election or referendum, Ques-Chain guar-
antees the consistency of the rule for all voters, making
sure that every voter has chances exactly the organizer
given to vote. Computing tasks can be distributed either
throughout the Ethereum main network or to everyone
in the country of election who volunteers to verify the
computation with his or her computer.
The estimated cost of conducting the Brexit referendum
using Ques-Chain on the Ethereum main network is 3.9
million pounds, 97% lower than the traditional way which
cost 129.1 million pounds [10]. The latter way of using
volunteer computation power may save even more. Online
retailers may utilize Ques-Chain to collect customers’
reviews. With full control of submission permission, shop-
ping sites save money and time countering spam reviews,
being able to show real ones to interested customers. Cor-
porations can conduct employee evaluations using Ques-
Chain. Anonymity is protected to encourage real feedback
and prevent gossips or bullying. Non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) may also evaluate projects they carried
out or sponsored with the help of Ques-Chain.
Ques-Chain can be used in a situation which has a
high information-security requirements. For the organi-
zations want to hear real thoughts from their employ-
ees and clients. However, the latter may have concerns
5Fig. 3. Applications of Ques-Chain protocol.
about whether their expression will bring them bad con-
sequences. Such concerns may lead to distorted feedback
results. Even if organizations don’t care about the exact
identity of feedback sources, with current technology, they
are not equipped to prove or ensure that they won’t do so.
Votes, questionnaires, outcome assessment, opinion col-
lection, complaint reporting, etc., all applications which
involve anonymous feedback can take advantage of Ques-
Chain. While the permission right is held by organizers,
voters’ anonymity is still protected.
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